We present new practical local differentially private heavy hitters algorithms achieving optimal or near-optimal worst-case error and running time -TreeHist and Bitstogram. In both algorithms, server running time isÕ(n) and user running time isÕ(1), hence improving on the prior state-of-the-art result of Bassily and Smith [STOC 2015] requiring O(n 5/2 ) server time and O(n 3/2 ) user time. With a typically large number of participants in local algorithms (n in the millions), this reduction in time complexity, in particular at the user side, is crucial for making locally private heavy hitters algorithms usable in practice. We implemented Algorithm TreeHist to verify our theoretical analysis and compared its performance with the performance of Google's RAPPOR code.
Introduction
We revisit the problem of computing heavy hitters with local differential privacy. Such computations have already been implemented to provide organizations with valuable information about their user base while providing users with the strong the strong guarantee that their privacy would be preserved even if the organization is subpoenaed for the entire information seen during an execution. Two prominent examples are Google's use of RAPPOR in the Chrome browser [11] and Apple's use of differential privacy in iOS-10 [19] . These tools are used for learning new words typed by users and identifying frequently used emojis and frequently accessed websites. Differential privacy in the local model. Differential privacy [10] provides a framework for rigorously analyzing privacy risk and hence can help organization mitigate users' privacy concerns as it ensures that what is learned about any individual user would be (almost) the same whether the user's information is used as input to an analysis or not.
Differentially private algorithms work in two main modalities: curator and local. The curator model assumes a trusted centralized curator that collects all the personal information and then analyzes it. In contrast, the local model does not involve a central repository. Instead, each piece of personal information is randomized by its provider to protect privacy even if all information provided to the analysis is revealed. Holding a central repository of personal information can become a liability to organizations in face of security breaches, employee misconduct, subpoenas, etc. This makes locally private computations attractive for implementation. Indeed in the last few years Google and Apple have announced successful deployments of locally private analyses [11, 19] . Challenges of the local model. A disadvantage of the local model is that it requires introducing noise at a significantly higher level than what is required in the curator model. Furthermore, some tasks tasks which are possible in the curator model are impossible in the local model [10, 16, 8] . To see the effect of noise, consider estimating the number of HIV positives in a given population of n participants. In the curated model, it suffices to add Laplace noise of magnitude O (1), i.e., independent of n [10] . In contrast, a lowerbound of Ω ( √ n) is known for the local model [8] . A higher noise level implies that the number of participants n needs to be large (maybe in the millions for a reasonable choice 1 . The construction by Thakurta et al. is a heuristic with no bounds on server running time and accuracy. 2 User computation time isÕ(1), a significant improvement over [4] . Our contributions. The focus of this work is on the design of locally private heavy hitters algorithms with near optimal error, keeping time, space, and communication complexity minimal. We provide two new constructions of heavy hitters algorithms TreeHist and Bitstogram. These algorithms achieve similar performance but apply different techniques. We implemented Algorithm TreeHist and provide measurements in comparison with RAPPOR [11] (the only currently available implementation for local histograms). Our measurements are performed with a setting that is favorable to RAPPOR (i.e., a small input domain), yet they indicate that Algorithm TreeHist performs better than RAPPOR in terms of noise level. Table 1 details various performance parameters of algorithms TreeHist and Bitstogram, and the reader can check in the table that these are similar up to small factors which we ignore for the rest of this paragraph. Comparing with [4] , we improve time complexity both at the server (reduced from O(n 5/2 ) toÕ(n)) and at the user (reduced from O(n 3/2 ) to O(max (log n, log d) 2 )). Comparing with [19] , we get provable bounds on the server running time and worst-case error. Note that Algorithm Bitstogram achieves optimal worst-case error whereas Algorithm TreeHist is almost optimal, by a factor of log(n).
Performance metric
TreeHist Bitstogram Server time (modular multiplications)Õ (n)Õ (n) User time (modular multiplications)
O max (log n, log d) 2 O max (log n, log d) 2 Server processing memoryÕ ( √ n)Õ ( √ n) User memory O (max(log d, log n)) O (max(log d, log n)) Communication/user O (1) O (1) Worst-case Error O n log(n) log(d) O n log(d) Table 1 : Performance of our protocols. Dependency on the privacy parameter and failure probability β is omitted.
Elements of the constructions. Main details of our constructions are presented in sections 3.1 and 3.2. These are complemented with the detailed descriptions and analyses in the appendix. Both our algorithms make use of frequency oracles -data structures that allow estimating various counts. Algorithm TreeHist identifies heavy-hitters and estimates their frequencies by scanning the levels of a binary prefix tree whose leaves correspond to dictionary items. The recovery of the heavy hitters is in a bit-by-bit manner. As the algorithm progresses down the tree it prunes all the nodes that cannot be prefixes of heavy hitters, hence leaving O( √ n) nodes in every depth. This is done by making queries to a frequency oracle. Once the algorithm reaches the final level of the tree it identifies the list of heavy hitters. It then invokes the frequency oracle once more on those particular items to obtain more accurate estimates for their frequencies. Algorithm Bitstogram hashes the input domain into a domain of size roughly √ n. The observation behind this algorithm is that if a heavy hitter x does not collide with other heavy hitters then (h(x), x i ) would have a significantly higher count than (h(x), ¬x i ) where x i is the ith bit of x. This allows recovering all bits of x in parallel given an appropriate frequency oracle.
Background and Preliminaries

Definitions and Notation
Dictionary and user items:
We consider a set of n users, where each user i ∈ [n] holds an item v i ∈ V. We will use v i to refer to the binary representation of v i when it is clear from the context. Item frequency (duplicity): For each item v ∈ V, we define the frequency f (v) of v as the number of users holding v, namely,
Frequency oracle: A frequency oracle is a data structure together with an algorithm that, for any given v ∈ V, allows computing an estimatef (v) of the frequency f (v).
Heavy hitters (succinct histogram):
A succinct histogram is a data structure that provides a (short) list of items (v 1 , ...,v k ), called the heavy hitters, together with estimates for their frequencies (f (v j ) : j ∈ [k]). The frequencies of the items not in the list are implicitly estimated asf (v) = 0. We measure the error in a succinct histogram by the ∞ distance between the estimated and true frequencies, max v∈ [d] f (v) − f (v) . We will also consider the maximum error restricted to the items in the list (v 1 , ...,v k ), that is, max j∈[k] f (v j ) − f (v j ) . If a succinct histogram aims to provide ∞ error η, the list does not need to contain more than O(1/η) items since items with estimated frequencies below η may be omitted from the list.
Local Differential Privacy
In the local model, an algorithm A : V → Z accesses the database v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ V n only via an oracle that, given index i ∈ [n], runs a randomized algorithm (local randomizer) R : V →Z on input v i and returns R(v i ) to A. Definition 2.1 (Local differential privacy [10, 12, 16] ). An algorithm satisfies -local differential privacy (LDP) if it accesses the database v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ V n only via invocations of a local randomizer R and if for all i
denote the algorithm's invocations of R on the data sample v i , then the algorithm A(·)
That is, if for any pair of inputs v, v that differ on a single input, and for all S ⊆ Range(A),
Count Sketch and Hadamard Transform
Count sketch [9] together with Hadamard transform form the basis of our differentially private construction outlined in Section 3.1 and discussed in detail in Section 5. Count sketch [9] is a sketching algorithm for finding frequent elements in a data stream. Let V = [d] be a domain of data elements, and v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) be a stream of data elements. Count sketch ensures that for any given v ∈ V, using a data structure of size m = O n log(1/β) k one can ensure that with probability at least 1 − β the estimated frequency of v is within k of the true frequency, and the estimate is unbiased. The algorithm works as follows: First, pick t pairs of hash functions (h i : V → [m], g i : V → {−1, 1}), and set a matrix M = {0} t×m . Second, with every data sample v i , populate the matrix as follows:
Hadamard transform: We use Hadamard transform followed by sampling in order to compress our data transmission from the client to the server and to reduce the space requirements of our protocol. Hadamard transform of a vector w ∈ R m is obtained via multiplying with the Hadamard transform matrix
, and H 1 = [1] . Two main properties of Hadamard transform we use are: i) it is a dense basis transformation, i.e. the columns of the Hadamard matrix form a basis, and each entry of
and ii) any entry (i, j) in √ m · H m can be computed in O(log m) time.
Error correction codes
We will use error correction codes in order to reduce the error of (some of) our constructions outlined in Section 3.2 and discussed in detail in Section 6. 
The code is ζ-decodable if for every x ∈ {0, 1} k and every y ∈ {0, 1} n whose Hamming distance to Enc(x) is at most ζn we have that Dec(y) = x.
For any constant 0 < ζ < 1/4, there is a construction of a ζ-decodable (n, k)-code, where n = O(k), and furthermore, Enc and Dec run in time O(n). See, e.g., [14] .
Tools from Probability
k-wise Independence
We will use the following tail bound on sums of k-wise independent random variables.
Lemma 2.3 ([6])
. Let λ ≥ 6 be an even integer. Suppose X 1 , · · · , X n are k-wise independent random variables taking values in [0, 1]. Let X = X 1 + · · · + X n and µ = E[X], and let α > 0. Then,
The Poisson Approximation
We will use the following useful facts about the Poisson approximation. When throwing n balls into R bins, the distribution of the number of balls in a given bin is Bin(n, 1/R). As the Poisson distribution is the limit distribution of the binomial distribution, the distribution of the number of balls in a given bin is approximately Pois(n/R). In fact, in some cases we could approximate the joint distribution of the number of balls in all the bins by assuming the load at each bin is an independent Poisson random variable with mean n/R. Theorem 2.4 (e.g., [18] ). Suppose that n balls are thrown into R bins independently and uniformly at random, and let X i be the number of balls in the i th bin, where
In particular, the theorem states that any event that takes place with probability p in the Poisson case, takes place with probability at most pe √ n in the exact case (this follows by letting f be the indicator function of that event).
We will also use the following bounds for the tail probabilities of a Poisson random variable:
Our Algorithms
In this section we give an informal description of our algorithms, and highlight some of the ideas behind our constructions.
The TreeHist Protocol
We briefly give an overview of our construction that is based on a compressed, noisy version of the count sketch. To maintain clarity of the main ideas, we give here a high-level description of our construction. We refer to Section 5 for a detailed description of this construction. We first introduce some objects and public parameters that will be used in the construction: Prefixes: For a binary string v, we will use v[1 : ] to denote the -bit prefix of v. Let V = v ∈ {0, 1} for some ∈ [log d] . Note that elements of V arranged in a binary prefix tree of depth log d, where the nodes at level of the tree represent all binary strings of length . The items of the dictionary V represent the bottommost level of that tree. Note that |V| = 2d. We will use ⊥ to denote an empty string. For a v ∈ {0, 1} and b ∈ {0, 1}, let v b denote the + 1-bit string resulting from appending the bit b to v. For a binary string v, we define Child(v) v 0, v 1 , that is, the set containing the two children of v in the prefix tree. Similarly, for a set of strings U, we define ChildSet(U) v : v ∈ Child(u) for some u ∈ U . Hashes: Let t, m be positive integers to be specified later. We will consider a set of t pairs of hash functions
and g i : V → {−1, +1} are independently and uniformly chosen pairwise independent hash functions.
Basis matrix: Let W ∈ − 1, +1 m×m be √ m · H m where H m is the Hadamard transform matrix of size m. As will be shown later, we will be making operations over the entries of this matrix. It is important to note that we do not need to store this matrix. The value of any entry in this matrix can be computed in O(log m) bit operations given the (row, column) index of that entry. In particular, suppose we want to compute the value of the entry W i,j located at the i-th row and j-th column. Let (i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i log m−1 ) and (j 0 , j 1 , . . . , j log m−1 ) denote the bit representation of i and j, respectively. Then, W i,j = (−1)
The total number of users n, the size of the Hadamard matrix m, the number of hash pairs t, the privacy parameter , the confidence parameter β, and the hash functions (h 1 , g 1 ), . . . , (h t , g t ) are assumed to be public information. We set t = O(log(n/β)) and m = O n log(n/β) . Public randomness: In addition to the t hash pairs {(h 1 , g 1 ), . . . , (h t , g t )}, we assume that the server creates a random partition Π :
, and another random function Q : [n] ← [m] that assigns 3 to each user i a uniformly random index r i ← [m]. We assume that such random indices i , j i , r i are shared between the server and each user.
First, we describe the two main modules of our protocol.
A local randomizer: LocalRnd
For each i ∈ [n], user i runs her own independent copy of a local randomizer, denoted as LocalRnd, to generate her private report. LocalRnd of user i starts by acquiring the index triple
from public randomness. For each user, LocalRnd is invoked twice in the full protocol: once during the first phase of the protocol (called the pruning phase) where the high-frequency items (heavy hitters) are identified, and a second time during the final phase (the estimation phase) to enable the protocol to get better estimates for the frequencies of the heavy hitters.
In the first invocation, LocalRnd of user i performs its computation on the i -th prefix of the item v i of user i, whereas in the second invocation, it performs the computation on the entire user's string v i . Apart from this, in both invocations, LocalRnd follows similar steps. It first selects the hash pair (h ji , g ji ), computes c i = h ji (v i [1 :˜ ]) (where˜ = i in the first invocation and˜ = log d in the second invocation, and v i [1 :˜ ] is the˜ -th prefix of v i ), then it computes a bit x i = g ji v i [1 :˜ ] · W ri,ci (where W r,c denotes the (r, c) entry of the basis matrix W). Finally, to guarantee -local differential privacy, it generates a randomized response y i based on x i (i.e., y i = x i with probability e /2 /(1 + e /2 ) and y i = −x i with probability 1/(1 + e /2 ), which is sent to the server. Our local randomizer can thought of as a transformed, compressed (via sampling), and randomized version of the count sketch [9] . In particular, we can think of LocalRnd as follows. It starts off with similar steps to the standard count sketch algorithm, but then deviates from it as it applies Hadamard transform to the user's signal, then samples one bit from the result. By doing so, we can achieve significant savings in space and communication without sacrificing accuracy.
A frequency oracle: FreqOracle
Suppose we want to allow the server estimate the frequencies of some given subset V ⊆ {0, 1} for some given ∈ [log d] based on the noisy users' reports. We give a protocol, denoted as FreqOracle, for accomplishing this task. For each queried itemv ∈ V and for each hash index j ∈ [t], FreqOracle computes c = h j (v), then collects the noisy reports of a collection of users I ,j that contains every user i whose pair of prefix and hash indices ( i , j i ) match ( , j). Next, it estimates the inverse Hadamard transform of the compressed and noisy signal of each user in I ,j . In particular, for each i ∈ I ,j , it computes y i W ri,c which can be described as a multiplication between y i e ri (where e ri is the indicator vector with 1 at the r i -th position) and the scaled Hadamard matrix W, followed by selecting the c-th entry of the resulting vector. This brings us back to the standard count sketch representation. It then sums all the results and multiplies the outcome by g j (v) to obtain an estimatef j (v) for the frequency ofv. As in the count sketch algorithm, this is done for every j ∈ [t], then FreqOracle obtains a high-confidence estimate by computing the median of all the t frequency estimates.
The protocol: TreeHist
The protocol is easier to describe via operations over nodes of the prefix tree V of depth log d (described earlier). The protocol runs through two main phases: the pruning (or, scanning) phase, and the final estimation phase.
In the pruning phase, the protocol scans the levels of the prefix tree starting from the top level (that contains just 0 and 1) to the bottom level (that contains all items of the dictionary). For a given node at level ∈ [log d], using FreqOracle as a subroutine, the protocol gets an estimate for the frequency of the corresponding -bit prefix. For any ∈ [log(d) − 1], before the protocol moves to level + 1 of the tree, it prunes all the nodes in level that cannot be prefixes of actual heavy hitters (high-frequency items in the dictionary).Then, as it moves to level + 1, the protocol considers only the children of the surviving nodes in level . The construction guarantees that, with high probability, the number of survining nodes in each level cannot exceed O n log(d) log(n) . Hence, the total number of nodes queried by the protocol (i.e., submitted to FreqOracle) is at most O n log(d) log(n) . In the second and final phase, after reaching the final level of the tree, the protocol would have already identified a list of the candidate heavy hitters, however, their estimated frequencies may not be as accurate as we desire due to the large variance caused by the random partitioning of users across all the levels of the tree. Hence, it invokes the frequency oracle once more on those particular items, and this time, the sampling variance is reduced as the set of users is partitioned only across the t hash pairs (rather than across log(d) × t bins as in the pruning phase). By doing this, the server obtains more accurate estimates for the frequencies of the identified heavy hitters. The privacy and accuracy guarantees are stated below. The full details are given in Section 5.
Privacy and Utility Guartantees
Theorem 3.1. Protocol TreeHist is -local differentially private.
Theorem 3.2.
There is a number η = O n log(n/β) log(d))/ such that with probability at least 1 − β, the output list of the TreeHist protocol satisfies the following properties:
1. it contains all items v ∈ V whose true frequencies above 3η.
2. it does not contain any item v ∈ V whose true frequency below η.
3. Every frequency estimate in the output list is accurate up to an error ≤ O n log(n/β)/
The Bitstogram Protocol
We now present a simplified description of our second protocol, that captures most of the ideas. Any informalities made hereafter are removed in the full description of the protocol (Section 6). First
Step: Frequency Oracle. Recall that a frequency oracle is a protocol that, after communicating with the users, outputs a data structure capable of approximating the frequency of every domain element v ∈ V. So, if we were to allow the server to have linear runtime in the domain size |V| = d, then a frequency oracle would suffice for computing histograms. As we are interested in protocols with a significantly lower runtime, we will only use a frequency oracle as a subroutine, and query it only for (roughly) √ n elements.
Let Z ∈ {±1} d×n be a matrix chosen uniformly at random, and assume that Z is publicly known. 4 That is, for every domain element v ∈ V and every user j ∈ [n], we have a random bit Z[v, j] ∈ {±1}. As Z is publicly known, every user j can identify its corresponding bit Z[v j , j], where v j ∈ V is the input of user j. Now consider a protocol in which users send randomized responses of their corresponding bits. That is, user j sends y j = Z[v j , j] w.p. 
To see that a(v) is accurate, observe that a(v) is the sum of n independent random variables (one for every user). For the users j holding the input v (that is, v j = v) we will have that
For the other users we will have that y j and Z[v, j] are independent, and hence
That is, a(v) can be expressed as the sum of n independent random variables: f (v) variables with expectation 1, and (n − f (v)) variables with expectation 0. The fact that a(v) is an accurate estimation for f (v) now follows from the Hoeffding bound. 
Second
Step: Identifying Heavy-Hitters. Let us assume that we have a frequency oracle protocol with worst-case error τ . We now want to use our frequency oracle in order to construct a protocol that operates on two steps: First, it identifies a small set of potential "heavy-hitters", i.e., domain elements that appear in the database at least 2τ times. Afterwards, it uses the frequency oracle to estimate the frequencies of those potential heavy elements. , where T will be set later. 6 We will now use h in order to identify the heavy-hitters. To that end, let v * ∈ V denote such a heavy-hitter, appearing at least 2τ times in the database S, and denote t * = h(v * ). Assuming that T is big enough, w.h.p. we will have that v * is the only input element (from S) that is mapped (by h) into the hash value t * . Assuming that this is indeed the case, we will now identify v * bit by bit.
, where v j, is bit of v j . That is, S is a database over the domain
, where the row corresponding to user j is (h(v j ), v j, ). Observe that every user can compute her own 4 As we later explain, Z has a short description, as it need not be uniform. 5 Event though we describe the protocol as having two steps, the necessary communication for these steps can be done in parallel, and hence, our protocol will have only 1 round of communication. 6 As with the matrix Z, the hash function h can have a short description length.
row locally. As v * is a heavy-hitter, for every ∈ [log d] we have that (t * , v * ) appears in S at least 2τ times, where v * is bit of v * . On the other hand, as we assumed that v * is the only input element that is mapped into t * we get that (t * , 1 − v * ) does not appear in S at all. Recall that our frequency oracle has error at most τ , and hence, we can use it to accurately determine the bits of v * . To make things more concrete, consider the protocol that for every hash value t ∈ [T ], for every coordinate ∈ [log d], and for every bit b ∈ {0, 1}, obtains an estimation (using the frequency oracle) for the duplicity of (t, b) in S (so there are log d invocations of the frequency oracle, and a total of 2T log d estimations). Now, for every t ∈ [T ] let us definev t where bit ofv t is the bit b s.t. (t, b) is more frequent than (t, 1 − b) in S . By the above discussion, we will have thatv t * = v * . That is, the protocol identifies a set of T log d domain elements, containing all of the heavy-hitters. The frequency of the identified heavy-hitters can then be estimated using the frequency oracle. Remark 3.1. As should be clear from the above discussion, it suffices to take T n 2 , as this will ensure that there are no collisions among different input elements. As we only care about collisions between "heavy-hitters" (appearing in S at least √ n times), it would suffice to take T n to ensure that w.h.p. there are no collisions between heavyhitters. In fact, we could even take T √ n, which would ensure that a heavy-hitter v * has no collisions with constant probability, and then to amplify our confidence using repetitions. √ n) satisfying:
Detailed Experimental Results
In this section we discuss implementation details of our algorithms mentioned in Section 5 7 . The main objective of this section is to emphasize the empirical efficacy of our algorithms along with the theoretical optimality in terms of error, space, time and communication. [19] recently claimed space space optimality for a similar problem, but a formal analysis (or empirical evidence) was not provided. Our experiments corroborate both the analytical bounds in our current work, and in [19] . Our experiments are performed on a macOS-Sierra 10.12 system (in Python 2.7) with 3.3Ghz (Intel Core i5) and 16GB of DDR-3 RAM.
Private Frequency Oracle
In this experiment, the objective is to test the efficacy of our algorithm in estimating the frequencies of a known set of dictionary of user items, under local differential privacy. We estimate the error in estimation while varying the size of the data set n, changing the privacy parameter . (See Section 2.1 for a refresher on the notation.) Figure 1 shows results on a synthetic data set with the domain size of hundred (i.e., d = 100) drawn from a power law distribution with power of 15. The default parameters used in Figure 1 are: number of data samples (n) : 10 million, range of the hash function (m):
√ n, number of hash functions (t): 285, and the privacy parameter = 2.0.
For the hash functions, we used the prefix bits of SHA-256. The estimated frequency is scaled by the number of samples to normalize the result, and each experiment is averaged over ten runs. The bars for True refers to the the true frequencies, and the bars for Priv corresponds to the differentially private frequencies. The pctle corresponds to the frequency of a domain element at the corresponding percentile in the frequency distribution of the data set.
Observations: i) The plots corroborate the fact that the frequency oracle is indeed unbiased. The average frequency estimate (over ten runs) for each percentile is within one standard deviation of the corresponding true estimate. ii) The error in the estimates go down significantly as the number of samples are increased or the privacy parameter is increased.
In Figure 2 we show the result of changing the range of the hash function (m). The observation is that the results are seemingly insensitive to the range of the hash function. We also ran the same experiment ( Figure 3 ) on a real data set drawn uniformly at random the NLTK Brown corpus [1] . The data set we created has n = 10 million samples drawn i.i.d. from the corpus with replacement, and the system parameters are the same default parameters described earlier. In this plot, the rank corresponds to the rank of a domain element in the distribution of frequencies in the data set. The observation is here is also consistent with that of Figure  1 . Comparison to RAPPOR [11] : Here we compare ourselves to the only other system (RAPPOR project from GOOGLE) for the private frequency estimation problem whose code is publicly available. We took the snapshot of their code base (https://github.com/google/rappor) on May 9th, 2017. In order to perform a fair comparison, we tested our algorithm against one of their demo experiments available (Demo3 using the demo.sh script). We used the privacy parameter = ln(3), the number of data samples n = 1 million, and the data set to be the same data set generated by the demo.sh script. In Figure 4 we observe that for higher frequencies both RAPPOR and our algorithm perform similarly. However, in lower frequency regimes, the RAPPOR estimates are zero most of the times, while our estimates are closer to the true estimates. N.B. We do not claim that our algorithm would outperform the RAPPOR system on all problem instances. However, our current experiment does highlight the need to perform an at-scale comparison between the two algorithms. 
Private Heavy-hitters
In this section, we take on the harder task of identifying the heavy hitters, rather than estimating the frequencies of domain elements. We run our experiments on the same two data sets described earlier with the same setting of parameters, except now we assume that we do not know the domain. As a part of our algorithm design, we assume that every element in the domain is from the english alphabet set [a-z] and are of length exactly equal to six. If they are of larger length, we truncate then before entering them in the data set, and if they are of smaller length we tag a ⊥ at the end. We generate the domain elements for the synthetic data set by first generating the frequency histogram based on the power law distribution described earlier, and then assign random strings of length eight to each bin of the histogram. That becomes our data set. For the NLTK Brown corpus [1] , we sample n = 10 million samples with replacement from the corpus to form our data set. We set a threhold of 15 · √ n as the threshold for being a heavy hitter. We measure the efficacy of our system by measuring the precision and recall. Figures 5 and 6 show the true data distribution for the synthetic and the NLTK data set. In Table 4 .2 we state our corresponding precision and recall parameters. Our recall numbers are much better than the precision numbers, primarily because of the large number of negative examples (3 × 10 8 examples). In practice, if there are false-positives, they can be easily pruned using domain expertise. For example, if we are trying to identify new words which users are typing in English [2] , then using the domain expertise of English, a set of false positives can be easily ruled out by inspecting the list of heavy hitters output by the algorithm. Further, notice that since we are working with domain elements with size six characters, a brute force algorithm would require 26 6 queries to the frequency oracle, which would be computationally (near) infeasible. While there are other algorithms for finding heavy-hitters [4, 15] , either they do not provide any theoretical guarantee for the utility [11, 13, 19] , or there does not exist a scalable and efficient implementation for them. Our work scores well on both these aspects. We start with a detailed description of our construction described at a high level in Section 3.1. We refer to Section 3.1 for definitions and public parameters that will be used in the construction, namely, prefixes, hashes, the basis matrix, global parameters, and public randomness. We restate below our public parameters and, when applicable, their specific settings. Global parameters: We will assume that total number of users n, the size of the Hadamard matrix m, the number of hash pairs t, the privacy parameter , and the confidence parameter β are public parameters, and hence they will not be explicitly provided as inputs to the algorithms. For integer parameters, we will implicitly assume that results are rounded to the nearest integer. We set t = 110 log(n/β) and m = 48 n log(n/β) . The hash functions (h 1 , g 1 ), . . . , (h t , g t ) will also be assumed to be public information (this is O(log(d) log(n/β)) bits of shared randomness). Public randomness: In addition to the t hash pairs {(h 1 , g 1 ), . . . , (h t , g t )}, we assume that the server creates a random partition Π :
over the set of users, that is, a each user i gets a random pair
that represents the index of one of log(d) × t "buckets." Moreover, the server uses another random function Q : [n] ← [m] that assigns to each user i a uniformly random index r i ← [m]. We assume that such random indices i , j i , r i are shared between the server and each user. For each ∈ [log d] and each j ∈ [t], we define I ,j i : i = , j i = j and I j i :
A Local Randomizer: LocalRnd
For each i ∈ [n], user i runs her own independent copy of Algorithm 1 below, refered to as LocalRnd, to generate her private report. We note that LocalRnd takes a flag Final ∈ {0, 1} as an input. The role of this input will become clear when we discuss the full protocol. In a nutshell, the flag is used to distinguish between two invocations of LocalRnd.
In particular, the local randomizer of each user is invoked twice in the full protocol: once during the first phase of the protocol (called the pruning phase) where the high-frequency items (heavy hitters) are identified, and a second time during the final phase (the final estimation phase) to enable the protocol to get better estimates for the frequencies of the heavy hitters. Connection to count sketch and Hadamard transform: Our local randomizer can thought of as a transformed, compressed (via sampling), and randomized version of the count sketch. Up to Step 5 in LocalRnd (Algorithm 1), our algorithm follows the standard count sketch algorithm [9] . Starting from Step 6, we start to deviate from the standard count sketch as we apply Hadamard transform to the user's signal, then sample one bit from the result. Indeed
Step 6 can be thought of as a composition of two operations: first, we multiply the indicator vector e ci ∈ {0, 1} scaled Hadamard matrix W (this is equivalent to selecting w ci : the c i -th column of W), then we randomly sample one entry from w ci . By doing so, we can achieve significant savings in space and communication without sacrificing accuracy.
Algorithm 1 LocalRnd
Input: User i input: v i ∈ V, Flag: Final ∈ {0, 1}.
1: Using shared randomness, get random indices 
e /2 +1 −x i w.p.
The output of LocalRnd is 1 bit per invocation. Hence, during the entire span of the protocol, each user sends 2 bits to the server. Here, we will assume the user's identity (i.e., the index i ∈ [n]) associated with each report is known to the server, (e.g., from a higher layer in the communication protocol stack).
A Frequency Oracle: FreqOracle
Before describing our protocol for identifying the heavy hitters and estimating their frequencies, we first discuss a protocol for a simpler task. Suppose we want to allow the server estimate the frequencies of some given subset V ⊆ {0, 1} for some given ∈ [log d] based on the users' reports. Algorithm 2 describes a protocol, denoted as FreqOracle, for accomplishing this task. Note that in this protocol, we assume that all items whose frequencies are in question are given as inputs.
For each queried itemv ∈ V and for each hash index j ∈ [t], FreqOracle starts by collecting the noisy reports of the collection I ,j of users where each user i ∈ I ,j is assigned a pair of prefix and hash indices ( i , j i ) that matches ( , j). Next, it estimates the inverse Hadamard transform of the compressed and noisy signal of each user in I ,j . It then sums all the results and multiplies the outcome by g j (v) to obtain an estimatef j (v) for the frequency ofv. As in the count sketch algorithm, this is done for every j ∈ [t], then FreqOracle obtains a high-confidence estimate for the frequency ofv by computing the median of all the t frequency estimates. Inverse transform and back to count sketch: We note here that Steps 7 in FreqOracle (Algorithm 2) can be described as an inverse Hadamard transform of the users' compressed and noisy signals. In particular, each term y i W ri,c inside the sum can be described as a multiplication between y i e ri (where e ri is the indicator vector with 1 at the r i -th position) and the scaled Hadamard matrix W, followed by picking the c-th entry of the resulting vector. This brings us back to the standard count sketch representation [9] . The FreqOracle protocol then proceeds to process the frequency estimates in the same way a count sketch does. Indeed, Step 8 is a standard step in count sketch algorithm where a high-confidence frequency estimate is obtained via the median technique. Hence, we attain the functionality of the count sketch algorithm with much less space and communication by transforming the users' signals to the Fourier domain, compressing signals via sampling, and then transforming them back at the server.
Algorithm 2 FreqOracle
Input: Prefix length: ∈ [log d], a subset of -bit prefixes V ⊆ {0, 1} , collection of t disjoint subsets of users: for Hash index j = 1 to t do 3: Set s := g j (v) and c := h j (v).
4:
for Users i ∈Ĩ j do
5:
Get user-i's 1-bit report:
Get user-i's random index r i = Q(i) using public randomness.
7:
Compute the j-th estimate of the frequency ofv:f j (v) := γ · a i∈Ĩj y i · s · W ri,c . 
Succinct Histogram via a Tree Aggregation Protocol: TreeHist
We now describe our protocol (Algorithm 3), denoted as TreeHist, that outputs a succinct histogram, that is, it outputs a list of heavy hitters together with estimates for their frequencies. W.l.o.g., we will assume that n > log(n/β) log(d) since otherwise, we cannot guarantee less than trivial error (i.e., an error of order n). The TreeHist protocol:
The protocol is easier to describe via operations over nodes of the prefix tree V of depth log d. The protocol runs through two main phases: the pruning (or, scanning) phase, and the final estimation phase.
In the pruning phase, the protocol scans the levels of the prefix tree starting from the top level (that contains just 0 and 1) to the bottom level (that contains all items of the dictionary). For a given node at level ∈ [log d], using FreqOracle as a subroutine, the protocol gets an estimate for the frequency of the corresponding -bit prefix. As explained above, this estimate is obtained by FreqOracle by computing an estimate of the inverse Hadamard transform for the signal from each user that gets assigned to this level of the tree, and aggregating the resulting signals in exactly the same manner as it would be done in a standard count sketch (See Steps 7 and 8 in Algorithm 2). For any ∈ [log(d) − 1], before the protocol moves to level + 1 of the tree, it prunes all the nodes in level that cannot be prefixes of actual heavy hitters (high-frequency items in the dictionary). Then, as it moves to level + 1, the protocol considers only the children of the surviving nodes in level . The construction guarantees that, with high probability, Get the collection I ,j : j ∈ [t] using the random partition Π. {See "Public randomness" above.} 6: v
7:
Initialize NewPrefixes = ∅.
8:
for v ∈ ChildSet (Prefixes) do 9: iff (v) ≥ 2η then 10: Addv to NewPrefixes.
11:
Update Prefixes ← NewPrefixes.
12: Set γ := t
{Here I j = ∪ ∈[log d] I ,j as defined earlier in the "Public randomness" paragraph.} 14: return SuccHist.
the number of survining nodes in each level cannot exceed O n log(d) log(n/β) . Hence, the total number of nodes queried by the protocol (i.e., submitted to FreqOracle) is at most O n log(d) log(n/β) . In the second and final phase, after reaching the final level of the tree, the protocol would have already identified a list of potential heavy hitters, however, their estimated frequencies may not be as accurate as we desire due to the large variance caused by the random partitioning of users across all the levels of the tree. Hence, the protocol invokes the frequency oracle once more on those particular items, and this time, the sampling variance is reduced as the set of users is partitioned only across the t hash pairs (rather than across log(d) × t bins as in the pruning phase). By doing this, the server obtains more accurate estimates for the frequencies of the identified heavy hitters. The privacy and accuracy guarantees are formally stated in the following section.
Running Time and Processing Memory
Running Time: We note that Algorithm FreqOracle (Algorithm 2) is invoked log(d)+1 = O(log d) times by TreeHist (Algorithm 3): once per each level of the tree and another at the final estimation phase at the bottom level of the tree.
The main time-consuming step in FreqOracle is the summation in Step 7. This step is executed O n log n log d times in every invocation of FreqOracle since there are O n log n log d nodes queried in every level of the tree and for each node FreqOracle computes t ≈ log n frequency estimates. That is, in total, this step is executed O √ n log n log d times in the TreeHist protocol. A direct implementation would involve summing ≈ n bits each time this step is executed, and hence would amount for running time of ≈ n 1.5 . However, we now show that this can be reduced to ≈ n. Consider Step 7 of Algorithm FreqOracle when FreqOracle is invoked by TreeHist at any given prefix level ∈ [log d] during the pruning phase. We will not consider the final estimation phase here since its running time is dominated by that of the pruning ohase. Note that since the size of the basis matrix W is m = O n log n , there are only O n log n values that the row index r i can take. Hence,f j (v) (computed in Step 7) can be expressed as follows:
Thus, to implement Step 7 of FreqOracle for all items ( , j,v), we first compute i∈I ,j : ri=κ y i for every κ ∈ [m], ∈ [log d], and j ∈ [t] (this amounts to a running time of O(n) in total). Then, for every value of ( , j,v), computingf j (v) would require summing m = O n log n numbers. Hence, in total, the running time of TreeHist is O
Processing memory: For the implementation described above, Algorithm FreqOracle maintains m·t·log d sums of at most n bits each. This would require a processing memory of O √ n log 1.5 (n) log(d) bits. The memory required for all the remianing steps of the TreeHist protocol does not exceed this amount, and hence, the total processing memory required by TreeHist is O √ n log 1.5 (n) log(d) bits.
Privacy and Utility Guartantees
In this section we provide the privacy and utility gurantees for the TreeHist protocol. 1. SuccHist contains all items v ∈ V whose true frequencies above 3η.
2.
SuccHist does not contain any item v ∈ V whose true frequency below η.
Every frequency estimate in
SuccHist is accurate up to an error ≤ 147 √ n log(n/β)
We defer the proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 to Appendix A.
The following lemma state the error guarantees of the Algorithm FreqOracle used by the TreeHist protocol. Note that FreqOracle is invoked by the TreeHist protocol during both pruning and final estimation phases of the protocol. This lemma is central to our proof of Theorem 5.2. 
wheref (v) is the estimate of FreqOracle for the true frequency f (v) of the item v ∈ V.
Proof. Fix β ∈ (0, 1), ∈ [log d], t ≥ 110 log(n/β), m ≥ 48 n log(n/β) , and a subset V ⊆ {0, 1} of size | V| ≤ √ n.
We note that when FreqOracle is invoked by TreeHist in the pruning phase (i.e., Final = 0), the collection Ĩ j : j ∈ [t] = I ,j : j ∈ [t] and γ = t log d, whereas when FreqOracle is invoked by TreeHist in the final phase (i.e., Final = 1), the collection Ĩ j : j ∈ [t] = I j : j ∈ [t] and γ = t. We will use the generic notation Ĩ j : j ∈ [t] and γ since the same proof works for both cases.
There are three main sources of randomness. The first is due to randomness in the collection Ĩ j : j ∈ [t] induced by the random partitioning of users via Π. The second source of randomness is due to the randomness in the choice of the t hash pairs (h 1 , g 1 ), . . . , (h t , g t ) . The third source of randomness is due to the random row indices r i , i ∈ [n], generated by Q, and the randomization for privacy (step 7 in Algorithm 1).
Before we discuss the guarantees we can attain under these sources of randomness, we first introduce some notation. For j ∈ [t], v ∈ V, we define fĨ
is the number of users inĨ j whose the -prefix of their items is v, and define nĨ j Ĩ j , i.e., nĨ j is the number of users inĨ j . LetfĨ γ and n γ , respectively. By Theorem 2.5 (a tail bound for the Poisson distribution), the union bound, and assuming that n ≥ 48γ (the assumption stated in the lemma), then with probability at least 0.996, we have , then by Chernoff's bound, with probability at least
Using Theorem 2.4 (the Poisson approximation), with probability at least 1 −
, we have |G 1 (v)| ≥ 9 10 t. Hence, by the fact that | V| ≤ √ n and the union bound, with probability at least 1 − 
In particular, we can write this error as
where
By the pairwise independence property of h j and the union bound, the first probability term on the right hand side is bounded from above by
. We now consider the second probability term. Note that the event we conditioned on in the second probability term implies that for every i ∈Ĩ j where v i = v, we must have fĨ
Hence, conditioned on this event, by the pairwise independence of each of h j and g j , we have
Hence, by using Chebyshev's inequality, the second probability term is bounded by
where the last inequality follows from the fact that j ∈ G 1 (v) and the fact that m ≥ 48 n log(n/β) . Thus, with probability at least 0.996, for every v ∈ V and every j ∈ G 1 (v), we have
Now, as we conditioned on the event in Claim 5.4, this implies that with probability at least 0.996, for every v ∈ V and every j ∈ G 1 (v), we have
Conditioned on the event of Claim 5.4, |G 1 (v)| ≥ For every i ∈ [n] let r i ← [m] be the row index chosen uniformly at random for user i using the random function Q, and let y i denote the randomized bit generated by user i in step 7 of Algorithm 1. As was denoted in algorithm FreqOracle, for each v ∈ V, letf j (v) = γa i∈Ĩj y i g j (v) W ri,hj (v) denote the j-th frequency estimate of FreqOracle for v ∈ V.
For each v ∈ V, let
Claim 5.6. Conditioned on the events in Claims 5.4 and 5.5, with probability at least 1 − β 3 log d over the randomness in (r i , y i ) : i ∈Ĩ j , j ∈ [t] , for all v ∈ V, we have |G 3 (v)| ≥ 7 10 t Fix v ∈ V and j ∈ G 2 (v). Note that, conditioned on any realization forĨ j , each term in the sum
is independent, zero mean random variable whose support length is bounded by a +1 = O
1
. Hence, by Chernoff's bound, with probability at least 0.99, we have i∈Ĩj
Thus, conditioned on the events in Claims 5.4 and 5.5, with probability at least 0.99, we have
Conditioned on the event of Claim 5.5,
We note also that the above sums for j = 1, . . . , t are independent. Thus, conditioned on the event of Claim 5.5, by Chernoff's bound, with probability at least 1 − 
Since for any item v, the final frequency estimatef (v) generated by FreqOracle is the median off 1 (v), . . . ,f t (v), then the above implies that with probability at least 1 −
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Locally Private Heavy-hitters bit-by-bit: The Bitstogram Protocol
We will use the following notation. Let S ∈ V n be a database, which may be distributed across n users (each holding one row). For v ∈ V, we will be interested in estimating the the duplicity of v in S, i.e., f S (v) = |{v i ∈ S : v i = v}|.
Warmup: A Simple Protocol for Heavy-Hitters
For readability, we first present a simplification of our protocol that captures most of the ideas. We will later modify the construction in order to reduce the worst-case error, space complexity, and time complexity of the protocol.
Frequency Oracle
Our protocols use the simple local randomizer R (Algorithm 4), where every user holds one bit, and flips it with probability 1/(e + 1).
Algorithm 4 R: Basic Randomizer
Inputs: x ∈ {±1}, and privacy parameter .
1. Generate and return a random bit z = x w.p. e /(e + 1) −x w.p. 1/(e + 1)
Oracle: LR Oracle access to S.
1. For j ∈ [n] let y j ← LR S (j, R).
On input
, and wait for the next input.
Lemma 6.1. Let ≤ 1, and fix a subset V ⊆ V of size d ≤ d. With probability at least 1 − β, algorithm ExplicitHist answers every v ∈ V with a(v) satisfying:
Proof. Fix v ∈ V , and denote
, and recall that algorithm ExplicitHist answers the query v with a(v) = e +1 e −1 · c(v). We start by analyzing the expectation of c(v):
That is, c(v) can be expressed as two sums of ±1 independent random variables: f S (v) variables with expectation e −1 e +1 , and (n − f S (v)) variables with expectation 0. Using the Hoeffding bound, with probability at least 1 −
e −1 · n · ln(4d /β). Using the union bound, this holds simultaneously for every v ∈ V with probability at least 1 − β. Observation 6.1. For the analysis above it suffices that, for every j ∈ [n], the entries of column j of Z are only pairwise independent. Furthermore, appealing to Lemma 2.3 (concentration of k-wise independent random variables) instead of the Hoeffding bound, is suffices that, for every v ∈ V, the entries of row v of Z are only k-wise independent, for k = 3 ln(d/β).
A Simple Heavy Hitters Protocol
Algorithm 6 SuccinctHist Public randomness: Random hash function h: V → [T ]. Random partition of [n] into log d subsets I 1 , · · · , I log d . Setting: Each player j ∈ [n] holds a value v j ∈ V. Define S = (v 1 , · · · , v n ). For ∈ [log d], let S = (h(v j ), v j, ) j∈I , where v j, is bit of v j . That is, S is a database over the domain [T ]×{0, 1}. 1. For ∈ [log d], use ExplicitHist(S ) with 2 to get a (t, b) for all (t, b) ∈ [T ]×{0, 1}.
For t ∈ [T ]
, definev t ∈ V, where bit ofv t isv t, = argmax{a (t, 0), a (t, 1)}.
3. Use ExplicitHist(S) with privacy parameter 2 to obtain a(v t ) for all t ∈ [T ]. w . Algorithm SuccinctHist returns a list L of length T satisfying:
Return list
2. For every v ∈ V s.t. f S (v) ≥ w, with probability 1/2 we have that v is in L.
Remark 6.2. The log log d factors in the above lemma can be removed by using an error correction code s.t. in order to recover a "heavy-hitter" v * it suffices to recover correctly only part of its (encoded) bits.
Proof. Item 1 of the lemma follows directly from Lemma 6.1. We now prove item 2. Assuming that n ≥ 12 log(d) log(12 log d), by the Chernoff bound, with probability at least 7/8 (over partitioning [n] into subsets I 1 , · · · , I log d ), for every
We continue the analysis assuming that this is the case. Fix v * ∈ V s.t. f S (v * ) ≥ w, and consider the following good event (over sampling h):
Event E 1 states that v * is mapped (by the hash function h) into a cell without too many collisions with different input elements. Denote t * = h(v * ). While the duplicity of v * in S is at least w, event E 1 states that other than v * there are at most w/4 elements which are mapped into t * . That is, v * dominates the cell t * . We first show that if E 1 occurs, then w.h.p. v * is in the list L. Asserting that w ≥ 32 log(d) log (16 log d) , by the Chernoff bound we get that with probability 7/8 (over parti-
If that is the case, then by the properties of algorithm ExplicitHist, for w ≥ 48 2n log d · ln(64 log d), with probability at least 1 − , where t * = h(v * ). Using the union bound, this holds simultaneously for all ∈ [log d] with probability at least 7/8, in which case v * =v t * is in the list L. It remains to show that Event E 1 occurs with high probability. To that end, observe that
Thus, by Markov's inequality, we have that
w completes the proof.
Reducing Space and Time Complexities
Oracle: LR Oracle access to S. 
For every
, and n ≥ 8R log(8d /β). With probability at least 1 − β, algorithm Hashtogram answers every v ∈ V with a(v) satisfying:
Observe that the error in the lemma is sub-optimal, as the optimal error behaves like 1 √ n log d. However, we will only use Lemma 6.4 with constant d and constant β, and hence, will not be effected by this issue. A similar analysis (for the same algorithm) gives better bounds for other settings of parameters. Specifically, Lemma 6.5. Let ≤ 1. Fix a subset V ⊆ V of size d ≤ d to be queried to algorithm Hashtogram. Let algorithm Hashtogram be executed with R ≥ 300 log(12nd /β) and n ≥ 43R and T ≥ · n/ log(nd /β). With probability at least 1 − β, algorithm Hashtogram answers every v ∈ V with a(v) satisfying:
As the analysis of the two lemmas are very similar, we only present the proof of Lemma 6.5. The proof of Lemma 6.4 appears in Section B for completness.
Proof of Lemma 6.5. Consider the following good event: For every query v * ∈ V there exists a subset R
Event E 1 states that for at least 7R/8 of the hash functions, we have that v * is mapped into a cell without too many collisions with different input elements. Informally, for every single hash function h r , algorithm Hashtogram estimates the number of occurrences of h r (v * ) in S. Hence, if event E 1 occurs, then most of the estimations result in accurate answers. We start by showing that event E 1 happens with high probability. To that end, fix v * ∈ V and fix r * ∈ [R]. We have that
As the hash functions are independent from each other, for R ≥ 48 ln(
, by the Chernoff bound we get that with probability at least
Using the union bound over every v * ∈ V , we have that event E 1 happens with probability at least 1 − β. We continue the analysis assuming that event E 1 occurs.
There exists a subset R 2 ⊆ [R] of size |R 2 | ≥ 
, by the Chernoff bound we get that event E 2 happens with probability at least 1 − β 3n in the Poisson case. Hence, by Theorem 2.4, event E 2 happens with probability at least 1 − β. We continue the analysis assuming that this is the case.
For every r ∈ [R], let S r = (v j ) j∈Ir denote a database containing the data of all users j s.t. j ∈ I r . Also for
For every query v * ∈ V there exists a subset R 
R are independent, assuming that R ≥ 300 ln( Using the union bound over every choice of v * ∈ V , we get that event E 3 happens with probability at least 1 − β. We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case. Event E 4 (over sampling Z and the coins of the local randomizers):
, and recall that algorithm Hashtogram answers the query v * ∈ V with a(v
. We now analyze the expectation of c r (v * ):
That is, c r (v * ) can be expressed as two sums of ±1 independent random variables: |I 
Fix v * ∈ V , and observe that the above sums are independent for different values of r. Hence, using the Chernoff bound and asserting that R ≥ 150 ln(d /β), for that fixed v * ∈ M , with probability at least 1 − β/d we have that Inequality (2) holds for at least 7R/8 choices of r ∈ R 1 . Using the union bound, with probability at least 1 − β, this is true for every v * ∈ V simultaneously. That is, event E 4 happens with probability at least 1 − β. We continue the analysis assuming that event E 4 occurs.
We are now ready to complete the proof. Fix v * ∈ V . Combining events E 3 and E 4 , we get that for every
Recall that for every r ∈ [R] we have that |S
That is, for every r ∈ R 
Processing Memory. Algorithm Hashtogram maintains (on step 2) R · T sums of at most n bits. This requires O(R · T · log n) bits for processing memory.
Runtime. Observe that a direct implementation of (step 2 of) algorithm Hashtogram consists of summing a total of T ≈ √ n bits per user, and hence results in a runtime of ≈ n 1.5
. As we next explain, this can be reduced to ≈ n. First observe that for the analysis of Lemma 6.5 (specifically, for the analysis of Event E 4 ), it suffices that, for every j ∈ [n], the entries of column j of Z are only pairwise independent. That is, each column of Z consists of T ≈ √ n pairwise independent bits. We can represent such a column using log T ≈ log √ n bits, in which case there are at most T ≈ √ n choices for the columns of Z (see, e.g., Construction 3.18 in [20] ). So, even though the matrix Z contains n columns, it has at most T ≈ √ n distinct columns. Let us denote those distinct columns as z 1 , . . . , z T , where
denotes the bit in position t in this column. We will write Z[·, j] = z γ to indicate that the j th column of Z is z γ . With this notation, we can restate a r (t) (computed on step 2 of algorithm Hashtogram) as follows.
Thus, we can implement step 2 of algorithm Hashtogram by first computing j∈Ir s.t. Z[·,j]=zγ y j for every 1 ≤ γ ≤ T and 1 ≤ r ≤ R (this amounts to summing a total of n bits, and can be done it time ≈ n). Afterwards, for every choice of (r, t), computing a r (t) consists of summing T ≈ √ n elements. Overall, step 2 of the algorithm can be executed in time ≈ R · T · T ≈ n log n.
The Full Protocol
Remark 6.3. The execution of Hashtogram on step 4 is made using the parameters stated in Lemma 6.5, in order to obtain accurate answers for every fixture of n queries with probability 1 − β. The executions of Hashtogram on step 1 are made using the parameters stated in Lemma 6.4, in order to obtain accurate answers for every fixture of two queries with probability 255/256. Observe that every such instantiation of Hashtogram is queried 2T times, and hence, some of these queries might result in inaccurate answers. Nevertheless, as will be made clear later, due to our use of error correction code, these inaccurate answers will not effect the final outcome of the algorithm.
Lemma 6.6. Algorithm Bitstogram satisfies -LDP.
Lemma 6.7. Let ≤ 1, and assume that log d ≥ O(log(n/β)). Set R = O (log(1/β)) and
Bitstogram returns a list L of length R · T satisfying:
1. With probability 1 − β, for every (v, a) ∈ L we have that |a − f S (v)| ≤ O 1 n log(n/β) . Random hash functions
With probability
, where c j, is bit of c j . That is, S r, is a database over the domain [T ]×{0, 1}.
, defineĉ r,t ∈ V , where bit ofĉ r,t isĉ r,t, = argmax{a r, (t, 0), a r, (t, 1)}.
4. Use Hashtogram(S) with privacy parameter 2 to obtain a(v r,t ) for all (r, t)
Remark 6.4. The assumption in Lemma 6.7 that log d ≥ O(log(n/β)) is without loss of generality, as otherwise the universe size d is small enough to allow the server to run in time linear in d, which makes the problem much easier. Specifically, if d < √ n then we can instantiate the frequency oracle of Lemma 6.1, and query it for every domain element. As d < √ n, this can be executed in time ≈ n (the runtime analysis is similar to the one in Section 6.2.1).
Otherwise, if d ≥ √ n then we already have that log d ≥ O(log n), and (if necessary) we can pad the representation of domain elements to satisfy the assumption that log d ≥ O(log(n/β)).
Proof of Lemma 6.7. Item 1 of the lemma follows directly from Lemma 6.5. We now prove item 2. Consider the following good event (over sampling h 1 , · · · , h R ):
There exists a subset R 1 ⊆ [R] of size |R 1 | ≥ We start by showing that event E 1 happens with high probability. To that end, fix v * ∈ S and fix r * ∈ [R]. We have that
Assuming that T ≤ n, there could be at most
T . Hence, using the union bound,
As the hash functions are independent from each other, for R ≥ 48 ln( T and every r * ∈ R 1 it holds that
That is, event E 1 happens with probability at least 1 − β. We continue the analysis assuming that event E 1 occurs. 
We analyze event E 3 in the Poisson case. To that end, fix v * ∈ S s.t. f S (v * ) ≥ Using the union bound, this holds simultaneously for every such v * with probability at least 1 − β. RT log d .
If that is the case, then there must be at least . If an iteration of this loop results in a value a(v r,t ) ≤ √ n, we can simply ignore it (recall that the frequencies of domain elements that are not in the list L are estimated as zero, and that √ n is less than the guaranteed bound on the error of the protocol, so this step does not effect our error bounds). As there could be at most √ n elements with frequencies at least ≈ √ n, the necessary processing memory is only ≈ √ n. γ = t = 110 log(n/β), we have that with probability at least 1 − β/ log(d), for everyv ∈ Prefixes, |f (v) − f (v)| ≤ 14 √ nt/ = O √ n log(n/β) . This proves item 3 of the theorem.
B Missing proofs from Section 6 B.1 Proof of Lemma 6.4
Consider the following good event: That is, c r (v) can be expressed as two sums of ±1 independent random variables: |I 
Fix v * ∈ V , and observe that the above sums are independent for different values of r. Hence, using the Chernoff bound and asserting that R ≥ 132 ln(d /β), for that fixed v * ∈ V , with probability at least 1 − β/d we have that Inequality (5) holds for at least 7R/8 choices of r ∈ [R]. Using the union bound, with probability at least 1 − β, this is true for every v * ∈ V simultaneously. That is, event E 2 happens with probability at least 1 − β. We continue the analysis assuming that event E 2 occurs. For every v * ∈ V we denote R 
Recall that for every v * ∈ V and every r ∈ [R] we have that |S r,v * | ≥ f S (v * ). Furthermore, for every v * ∈ V and every r ∈ R v * 1 we have that |S r,v * | ≤ f S (v * ) + 16n T . Hence, for every v * ∈ V and every r ∈ R v * 3 we have that
That is, for every r ∈ R v * 3 we have that R · a r (h r (v * )) is accurate up to error(v * ). As |R 
